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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Article VIII, §4 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, and §78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) , and Rule 3(a) , 
Supreme Court Rules. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES REVIEWED 
A. Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
B. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1. 
C. Utah Constitution, Article I, §2. 
D. Utah Constitution, Article I, §11. 
E. Utah Constitution, Article I, §24. 
F. Utah Constitution, Article VI, §23. 
G. Utah Constitution, Article VI, §26. 
H. Utah Constitution, Article XVI, §5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants, Jerry Cutshaw, individually and dba Interiors 
Contracting ("Cutshaw") and Max J. Smith and Max J. Smith and 
Associates, Inc. ("Smith"), essentially agree with the Statement 
of the Case as outlined by Plaintiff, Paul Lichtefeld ("Lichte-
feld"), on pages 1 through 3 of his Brief. 
However, Cutshaw and Smith except to the inclusion by 
Lichtefeld of what has been designated as "Addendum I18 in 
Lichtefeld"s Brief. Addendum 1 is a report by a structural 
1 
engineer commissioned by Lichtefeld to survey and assess damage to 
the structure in question• The lower Court based its dismissal of 
Lichtefeld's action strictly upon the legal aspects of the case. 
While the report in question was attached to an affidavit as an 
exhibit in the District Court proceeding, and therefore was 
included as part of the Record, there has been no determination by 
the District Court as to the evidentiary weight this report should 
be given, if any. Therefore, Cutshaw and Smith request that this 
Court disregard any reference to Addendum I in Lichtefeldfs Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
(hereafter §78-12-25.5") does not violate equal protection 
provisions of either the United States Constitution or the Utah 
Constitution. Cutshaw and Smith contend that §78-12-25.5 is 
reasonably enacted by the Legislature, and those persons protected 
under the statute constitute a class, separate and distinct from 
those who fall outside the protection of the statute. 
Section §78-12-25.5 does not violate the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, (Article I, §11 and Article 
XVI, §5), and the provisions of the statute do not violate the 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, §26, which forbids special laws or 
legislation. 
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Those granted immunity from suit (architects, contractors, 
surveyors and engineers) constitute a separate class, entitling 
them to immunity as defined in §78-12-25.5. Although Lichtefeld 
relies heavily on Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 769 (Utah 
1985), declaring unconstitutional Utah's Product Liability Act, in 
support of his argument that §78-12-25.5 be declared unconstitu-
tional, Cutshaw and Smith assert that there are great 
dissimilarities between the two acts, which warrant this Court 
distinguishing its ruling in Berry v. Beech Aircraft from 
application in the instant case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT SECTION 
78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS REASONABLY ENACTED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE, 
AND THUS DOES NOT DEPRIVE LICHTEFELD OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, §§2 AND 
24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION OR THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Lichtefeld cites both Article I, §§2 and 24 of the Utah Con-
stitution and §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution which guarantee individuals access to the judicial 
system and equal protection of laws, claiming that §78-12-25.5 
deprives him of these guaranties. 
Article X, §24 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
3 
"All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation," 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
prohibits states from enacting laws that deny persons within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 
Although the language of the Utah State and federal 
constitutional provisions are dissimilar, the Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that the provisions of the State Constitution embody the 
same general principles as the federal constitution, to-wit: 
Persons similarly situated should be treated similarly; and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if 
their circumstances were the same. See, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 669 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
The Utah court has determined that whether a statute meets 
equal protection standards depends in the first instance upon the 
objectives of the statute and whether the classifications 
established provide a reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives. See, Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 669. 
Lichtefeld, although pressing this Court to adopt a higher 
standard of review of §78-12-25.5, admits in his argument that the 
appropriate standard of review to be applied by the Supreme Court 
is the "rationality test" or "rational basis test." Lichtefeld 
cites no case law which supports his argument that, absent "suspect 
4 
classification," a higher standard of review by this Court would 
apply in this instance. (See, Appellate Brief, pp. 10-11.) 
Lichtefeld's reliance upon Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 97 
S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d. 397 (1976) in support of his contention 
that a higher level of review should be applied by this Court in 
this case is misplaced. Craig v. Boren reaffirms the proposition 
that matters involving purely economic matters are entitled only 
to the mildest standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Craig v. Boren. at 207. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that when the 
constitutionality of a statute is questioned, there are certain 
legal principles which must be observed in deciding the matter. 
Foremost among these principles is the 
presumption that a statute is constitutional 
and every reasonable doubt must be resoLved in 
its favor. A statute should be held valid 
unless there is a clear, complete and 
unmistakable violation of some specific 
provision of the constitution. 
Simms v. Smith. 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977). 
The level of scrutiny this Court must adopt in determining the 
constitutionality of §78-12-25.5, as noted above, is the "rational 
basis" test. Under the rational basis test, Lichtefeld must 
demonstrate, in his attack upon the constitutionality of the 
statute, that the statute does not rest upon any reasonable basis, 
but is essentially arbitrary. Utah Public Employee's Asso. v. 
5 
State. 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980). In Utah Public Employees1 Asso., 
the Utah Supreme Court approved the analysis of the principles 
under the traditional rational basis test referred to in Lindsley 
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed.2d 
369 (1910). The principles of the analysis as stated in Lindsley 
are as follows: 
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not take from the state the power to classify in the 
adoption of policy laws, but admits of the exercise of 
a wide-scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids 
what is done only when it is without any reasonable 
basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 
2. The classification having some reasonable basis does not 
offend against that clause merely because it is not made 
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it 
results in some inequality. 
3. When the classification in such a law is called in 
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be 
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that 
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be 
assumed. 
6 
4. One who assails the classification of such a law must 
carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon 
any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. 
In the case Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 
440, 20 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968), those principles as 
enunciated in Utah Public Employees1 Asso. were reaffirmed. See, 
Trade Commission, at 962. 
By its terms, §78-12-25.5, applies to all actions against the 
class of persons — architects, contractors, builders, surveyors, 
engineers and inspectors —• who perform the specific activities 
of designing, planning, supervision of construction or the 
construction of an improvement to real property. These roles and 
activities relate to the process of building a structure. See, 
Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1974). The Utah 
Legislature, by enacting §78-12-25.5 in 1967 focused on limiting 
the periodic liability of persons whose activities relate to the 
design, planning or construction of improvements to real property, 
in contrast to the owners of real property and those who supply 
materials and products utilized in making improvements thereon. 
Section 78-12-25.5, as adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1967 
provides: 
78-12-25.5 Injury Due to Defective Design or 
Construction of improvement to Real Property -
Within Seven Years. 
7 
No action to recover damages for any 
injury to property, real or personal, or for 
an injury to the person, or for bodily injury 
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective 
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property, nor any action for damages sustained 
on account of such injury, shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction 
or construction of such improvement to real 
property more than seven years after the 
completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) "Completion of construction" for the 
purposes of this act shall mean the date of 
issuance of a certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer 
or the agents, or the date of the owner's use 
or possession of the improvement on real 
property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual 
possession and control as owner, tenant or 
otherwise, of the improvement of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of 
the injury for which it is proposed to bring 
an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the periods otherwise 
prescribed by the laws of this state for the 
bringing of any action. 
In 1988 the Utah Legislature expanded the class protected by 
the statute to include persons responsible for surveying property. 
See, §78-12-25.5 (1988 revised statute) (Addendum III). This 
expansion of the class by the Legislature, as well as its 
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clarification of ambiguities in the prior statute, demonstrates 
clearly the intent of the Legislature of the State of Utah to 
distinguish this group from those excluded by the language of the 
statute, such as materialmen, owners and occupants of the improved 
property. 
Courts in many other states have held that the distinction 
made between these groups is reasonable and thus statutes of this 
type do not violate equal protection nor the prohibition against 
special legislation. See, Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 
455 SW.2 918 (1970), appeal dismissed 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 868, 
27 L.Ed.2d 800 (1971); Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital Building v. 
Hamill, 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage 
District No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978); 01Brian v. Hazelet and 
Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 SW.2d 336 (1980); Barnes v. J.W. Bateson 
Co. , Inc, 755 SW.2d 518 (Tx App. 1988); Anderson v. Fred Wagner and 
Roy Anderson, Jr.. Inc., 402 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. 
Ille Electric Company. 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); 
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 
(1972); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); 
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 Ac2d 
715 (1978); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Associates, Inc., 619 SWc2 
522, 524 (Tenn. 1981); Yakima Fruit and Cold Storage v. Central 
Heating and Plumbing Company, 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972). 
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As noted above, statutes similar to the one at hand have been 
reviewed by courts of other jurisdictions, and constitutionally 
rejected on equal protection grounds. For example, in Klein v. 
Catalano, 437 N.E.2d. 514 (Mass. 1982), the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts upheld its six year statute of repose and rejected 
the argument that the Massachusetts statute violated principles of 
equal protection, among other things. 
The Massachusetts court found a rational basis for enacting 
the statute, this basis being to eliminate stale claims and to 
prevent claims from being brought where evidence was no longer 
available to either party. 
The Massachusetts court noted that it may disagree with the 
philosophy of the legislature, but that the court was not in a 
position to question it as long as there was a rational basis for 
the enactment of the statute. The court stated: 
The legislature could reasonably conclude that 
the statistical improbability of meritorious 
claims after a certain length of time and the 
inability of the courts to adjudicate stale 
claims weigh more heavily than allowing the 
adjudication of a few meritorious claims. 
Klein, at 521, (fn. 11). 
The Massachusetts court then stated that while in some cases 
statutes of this nature may impose a great hardship on a plaintiff 
who has suffered injury and who has a meritorious claim, the 
10 
arguments as to hardship are appropriate for legislation and not 
for court interpretation. Klein, at 522. The court therefore 
upheld the equal protection attack on the constitutionality of the 
statute on the basis that the classification was reasonable. 
In Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corporation. 655 P.2d 822, 827 
(Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a Colorado 
statute similar to §78-12-25.5, constituted a legislative response 
to a recent trend in tort law which had extended architect 
liability, even after completion of the building and acceptance 
by the owner, to third parties injured by construction and design 
defects, but with whom the architect or contractor had no 
contractual relationship. The Yarbro court determined that since: 
Construction projects generally have expected 
useful lives of many years or decades, the 
possibilities for long-term liability for the 
professional architect or design engineer [or 
contractor] are enormous. Thus, as a matter 
of policy, the [State of Colorado] has limited 
the extended exposure to liability by barring 
suits against architects [and contractors] 
which are brought more than ten years after 
substantial completion of the building. 
Yarbro, at 827. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Josephs v. Burns, 
491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971), upheld its ten year statute of repose, 
in light of an attack that the statute was unconstitutional because 
of a claim that the statute violated the "remedy by due course of 
11 
law clause" of the Oregon constitution. The court rejected this 
argument, concluding that the state constitution did not inhibit 
the legislature from altering common law rights. In pertinent 
part, the court stated: 
It has always been considered a proper function 
of legislatures to limit the availability of 
causes of action by the use of statutes of 
limitation so long as it is done for the 
purpose of protecting a recognized public 
interest. It is in the interest of the public 
that there be a definite end to the possibility 
of future litigation resulting from past 
actions. It is a permissible constitutional 
legislative function to balance the possibility 
of outlawing legitimate claims against the 
public need that at some definite time there 
be an end to potential litigation. 
Josephs, at 208. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had the opportunity to examine the 
constitutionality of §78-12-25.5 In Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 
223 (Utah 1974), the Utah court recognized that the seven year 
limitation is applicable to an owner or tenant in possession at 
the time of the construction, or to their successors, insofar as 
the statute pertains to a cause of action of the owner or person 
in possession against a protected class [architects and 
contractors]; and that it is reasonable that those in possession 
or control of the realty should discover any fault in construction 
within seven years. Good, at 224. 
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This Court's attention is also directed to Hooper Water 
Improvement District v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982). In this 
case, Justice Howe in a concurring opinion addresses the issue of 
legislative intent in enacting §78-12-25.5. According to Justice 
Howe: 
This statute was enacted by the legislature in 
1967 and is similar to special statutes of 
limitation enacted in over thirty states. . . 
Its obvious intent was to protect "persons 
performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction, or construction" 
of improvements to real property from 
indefinite future liability. In that statute 
the legislature picked seven years after the 
completion of the construction as the period 
of limitation. 
* * * 
Under these special statutes of limitations 
actions are barred after the designated periods 
have run irrespective of whether the cilleged 
negligence of the professional has been 
discovered, or should have been discovered, by 
that date. 
Hooper, at 747. 
Justice Howe concluded his analysis of §78-12-25.5 by stating 
In view of that determination made by the 
legislature, there is no room for us by means 
of judicial interpretation to hold . . . that 
the statute of limitations should not run until 
the negligence of the professional was 
discovered, or could have been discovered, or 
until his professional relationship with the 
client was terminated. 
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Hooper, at 747.1 
It is apparent from the recent enlargement of the class 
protected by §78-12-25.5 to include surveyors as part of the 
class, that the Utah Legislature has given due consideration to 
the protected class, weighing the interests of the protected class 
against claims of owners of real property. The Utah Legislature 
has determined and this Court recognizes that the protected class 
deserves the limitations as set out in the statute, and that the 
class protected by the statute constitutes a separate and distinct 
class. As the Massachusetts court in Klein discussed, a rational 
basis for protecting the class does exist. Klein, at 521. It is 
not within the purview of this Court to determine the 
appropriateness of the statute in light of competing claims, but 
instead leave that determination to legislation. See, also, 
Josephs v. Burns, supra, at 208. 
The Clear Weight of Judicial Authority Supports Cutshaw's and 
Smith's Position that 78-12-15.5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
Amended) Passes Constitutional Scrutiny 
Lichtefeld urges that Turner Construction Company 
v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Ala. 1988), is controlling in 
the instant case. In Turner, the Alaska Supreme Court, 
in a demonstration of what may be termed as judicial 
overreaching, determined that a statute similar to the 
Utah statute in question was unconstitutional. The 
Turner Court based its decision upon the potential 
interest of joint tort feasors in obtaining contribution, 
an issue not present in this case. 
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This Court has recognized that it will give deference to the 
weight of judicial authority of other jurisdictions rulings on 
similar statutes in making a determination as to the constitu-
tionality of a statute. See, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, at 675, 
where this Court considered the weight of judicial authority with 
respect to the constitutionality of the guest statute enacted by 
the Utah State Legislature. 
The number of states in which the highest state court has held 
building immunity statutes to be constitutional is approximately 
twice the number holding to the contrary. (See Addendum I.) At 
least one commentator has found that a thorough reading of all the 
cases demonstrates that the better reasoned opinions are to be 
found from those courts upholding their respective state statutes. 
See, Volk; Statutes of Repose for Improvements to Real Property: 
Equal Protection Considerations. American Business Law Journal, 
Volume 22, p. 343, 379 (1984). These opinions hold that the 
distinctions between those who are and are not included in the 
statutes of protection are not artificial and that the 
classification scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state 
purpose.2 
2
 The best examples in this category are Yarbro v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983); Mullis v. 
Company Services, Inc., 250 Georgia 90, 296 S.E*2d 579 
(1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2, 366 
S.2d 1381 (Louisiana 1978); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass* 
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Ten state statutes respecting builders1 and architects1 
liability have been invalidated by the high courts of those states 
on equal protection or mixed equal protection and due process 
grounds. (See Addendum II.) These courts have generally made 
rulings with the holding that they could see no valid distinction 
between the architects, engineers and contractors who were 
protected and other potential defendants. See, e.g. Broome v. 
Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1978), wherein it is stated: 
Certainly such classification must fall if the 
benefit [i.e. immunity] granted to them is 
denied to others similarly situated. 
As noted by Lichtefeld, many of the cases holding building 
immunity statutes unconstitutional have relied heavily upon the 
first case decided in this area, Skinner v. Anderson, 231 NE.2d 
588 (1967), and generally quote from it extensively. Skinner has 
been severely criticized as being shallow and internally 
inconsistent. In Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Association, 619 SW.2d 
522, 524 (Tenn. 1981), the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: 
With deference to the Illinois Court [in 
Skinner], and to the other courts which have 
followed its holding, we do not find its 
rationale persuasive... [T]here is a substantial 
difference between landowners and tenants, who 
are excepted from the provisions of the . . . 
701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Eurdal, 
410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Rosenberg v. Town of 
North Burgen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972); Freezer Storage, 
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978). 
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statutes . . . and those engaged in the 
designing and erection of a building. The duty 
of the landowner or tenant in possession . . 
. is a continuing one, whereas the work of the 
architect, designer or engineer ordinarily 
cease with the completion of the building. Yet 
without limitations such as those provided in 
the subject statutes their exposure to tort 
claims could expand into the very distant 
future. 
Harmon. at 524. 
The constitutionality of builders1 and contractors1 statutes 
of repose has been upheld, as noted above, in at least twice the 
number of states that it has been declared unconstitutional * 
Lichtefeld's reliance on Skinner v. Anderson, supra, therefore, is 
not well taken. 
These jurisdictions which have reviewed and upheld the 
respective statutes of repose of the many states have set forth the 
reasoning behind the upholding the constitutionality of the 
statutes, all of which focuses on one essential point, that is: 
The class protected by the various statutes constitutes a separate 
and distinct class from those who fall outside the statutes, and 
therefore, deserve the protections of the statute. 
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POINT II 
THE LIMITATION ON ACTIONS EXPRESSED IN SECTION 
78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND FULFILLS THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL MANDATES OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The enactment of statutes such as §78-12-25.5 is a response 
from Legislatures of several states to mitigate a burden upon 
construction professionals imposed by the case of Inman v. 
Binghamton Housing Authority, 143 NE.2d, 895 (N.Y. 1957). In 
Inman, the New York Court banned the privity doctrine, whereby an 
architect or contractor was only liable to the building owner with 
whom he contracted. 
The Restatement of Torts published in 1965 recognized the rule 
set out in Inman. as stated: 
One who, on behalf of the possessor of land, erects a 
structure or creates any other condition thereon is 
subject to liability to others upon or outside of the 
land for physical harm caused by dangerous character of 
the structure or condition after his work has been 
accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those 
determining liability of one who, as manufacturer or 
independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of 
others. 
Prosser, Restatement of Torts §385 (West Publishing 1965). 
The underlying rationale for the adoption of legislation such 
as §78-12-25.5 is to avoid the difficulties of proof frequently 
arising from the passage of time and to provide a measure of 
security for professionals where such liability might extend to 
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retirement of the individuals and in perpetuity against corporate 
entities. See, Yolk, p. 351. Forty-Five states and the District 
of Columbia have enacted statutes designed to protect construction 
professionals from liability after a certain number of years from 
the date improvements to real property have been completed. 
Constitutional challenges to these statutes have resulted in 
twenty-nine state statutes being upheld as constitutional in their 
respective states1 highest court. Ten jurisdictions have declared 
these statutes unconstitutional. (See Addenda I and II.) 
Without the adoption of statutes such as §78-12-25.5, the 
architects and contractors would have unlimited exposures for the 
injuries sustained, even in an extreme situations.3 
An interesting hypothetical was posed in the brief of 
Amicus Curiae, Massachusetts State Association of 
Architects, page 3, brief for Klein v. Catalano, 386 
Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982). 
Henry Hobson Richardson was a 19th Century 
architect and builder in Boston Massachusetts. 
He was engaged by Trinity Church in 1871 to 
design and supervise the construction of a new 
church in February, 1887; his architectural 
firm survives to this day under the name of 
"Shepley, Bullfinch, Richardson and Abbott". 
. . In 1981 a communicant of the Trinity Church 
trips on the church steps after a Christmas 
service, to her great injury. The lawyer 
discovered that there are uneven risers which 
doubtlessly contributed to his client's fall. 
The client is understandably reluctant to sue 
her own vestry; why not seek recovery from the 
successor partnership, the designer of the 
uneven risers. (As quoted in Voik, Statutes 
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The Utah Legislature and the legislatures of the majority of 
other states and the District of Columbia have acted to mitigate 
this burden imposed by the Inman rule on construction professionals 
caused by the judicial termination of the privity doctrine. See 
Adair v. Koppes Company, 541 Fed. Supp. 1120, 1124 (ND Ohio 1982). 
In adopting these statues, legislatures have attempted to strike 
a balance between the public's right to a remedy and the 
construction professionals' need for a temporal outer limit on tort 
liability. See, Klein v. Catalano, Mass. 437 N.E.2d 514, 521 
(1982). The reasons given by legislatures, including our own, in 
justifying the adoption of this type of statute were to encourage 
construction, to avoid the difficulties in proof that frequently 
arise from passage of time, and to provide for a measure of 
security for professionals where liability otherwise might extend 
into the retirement of individuals and in perpetuity for 
corporations. See, Volk at page 351; Hooper Water Improvement, 
supra, at 747. 
Definitionally, §78-12-25.5 and similar statutes adopted by 
other legislatures and the District of Columbia are not statutes 
ZflT—Repose for Improvements to Real Property: 
Equal Protection Consideration, Volume 22, 
American Business Law Journal, pages 343-344 
(1984) .) 
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of limitation, they are statutes of repose. As defined in 
Restatement of Torts (2d), paragraph 899, comment G (1979) : 
A statute of repose however, limits the time 
within which an action may be brought and is 
not related to the accrual of any cause of 
action. The injury need not to have occurred, 
much less have been discovered. 
Lichtefeld argues that Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985), is controlling in his assertion that as a statute of 
repose, §78-12-25.5 violates the Utah open courts provision. 
The court in Berry conducted its analysis of Article I, 
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution, and stated as follows: 
Article I, Section 11 does not recede before 
every legislative enactment, and neither may 
it be applied in a mechanical fashion to strike 
every statute with which there may be conflict. 
To hold every statute of repose unconstitution-
al without regard to legislative purpose could 
result in a legislative inability to cope with 
widespread social or economic evils. 
Berry, at 680. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open and every person for 
an injury done to him in person, property, or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
law which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party 
The basis for consideration of whether or not the Utah 
architects/builders statute of repose is constitutional was stated 
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by Justice Zimmerman in the Matter of Criminal Investigation in the 
Seventh District Court No. CS-1, March 31, 1988, 79 Utah Advance 
Reports, page 5 wherein it is stated: 
It is a well established rule that legislative 
enactments are endowed with a strong 
presumption of validity and will not be 
declared unconstitutional unless there is no 
reasonable basis upon which they can be 
construed as conforming to constitutional 
requirements • • . [I]n evaluating 
constitutional challenges to statutes, the 
court looks to "reasonable or actual 
legislative purposes" rather than to "any 
conceivable reason for the legislation . . . 
and will construe statues to "effectuate the 
legislative intent" while avoiding inter-
pretations that will conflict with relevant 
constitutional mandates. 
(Citations omitted.) See also, Utah Public Employees1 Asso., 
supra, p. 1273. 
Our Supreme Court in the case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corporation, considered the product liability statute of repose 
adopted by the Utah Legislature. 
The Berry Court held that Section 11 of the Declaration of 
Rights and the prerogative of the legislature are properly 
accommodated by applying a two-part analysis. 
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law," for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the 
alternative remedy must be substantially equal 
in value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable 
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substantive protection to ones person, 
property or reputation, although the form of 
substituted remedy may be different. 
Berry. at 680. 
In the alternative as a second test to the constitutionality 
of a statute of repose, Justice Stewart stated: 
Second, if there is no substitute or alterna-
tive remedy, abrogation of the remedy or cause 
of action may be justified only if there is 
clear social or economic evil to be eliminated 
and the elimination of the existing legal 
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means for achieving the objective. 
Berry. at 680. 
a) Lichtefeld retains an alternative remedy against the original 
owner of the structure, 
Lichtefeld in this case has potential causes of action 
against the prior owner of the structure and materialmen who 
are not exempted from the operation of §78-12-25.5. 
By adoption of the subject statute of repose the Utah 
Legislature has determined it reasonable to engage in shifting 
the risk of structural failure after the passage of seven 
years from the substantial completion of the structure. 
Apportioning such risks has been held to be a proper and 
constitutionally permissible legislative function. See, 
Salinero v. Pon, 124 Cal. App., 120 (1981); Anderson v. Fred 
Waggoner and Roy Anderson, Jr. . Inc. , 402 S.2d 320, 322 (Miss. 
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1981). The effect of risk shifting is to make the owner or 
other possessor of the property responsible for insurance 
against loss and to thereby relieve the protected classes of 
architects, engineers and contractors of the necessity of 
securing insurance which could cover contingent liabilities 
for an indefinite period of time. An owner or possessor of 
the property has been viewed as the logical person upon whom 
such insurance burden should fall because he is in the best 
position to maintain the premises. See, Pacific Indemnity 
Company v. Thompson Yeager, Inc., 260 NW.2d 555, 562 (Minn. 
1977); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Assoc, Inc., 619 SW.2d 522 
(Tenn. 1981). 
b) Section 78-12-25.5 obviates a clear economic evil. 
The obvious economic evil that pervades without the 
statute of repose as adopted by the Utah Legislature is that 
architects/builders will be exposed for time immemorium to an 
unlimited class of plaintiffs, including the owner, occupier 
or unauthorized trespasser. See, Twin Falls Clinic and 
Hospital Building Corp. v. Hammil, 644 P.2d 341, 351 (Id. 
1982). In addition, the architect/builder liability may be 
founded on negligence, warranty, contract or even strict 
liability theories without the statute of repose. See, Abner 
v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 607 (1969). The 
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justification for not extending the protection of this statute 
to owners and shifting the burden to the owner after the 
passage of seven years has been held to be a irational function 
of the legislature to place different time limits on the 
liability of builders from those placed on persons in 
possession or control of the property, such as the owner, 
tenant or otherwise. See, Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514 
(Mass. 1982). 
As noted above, there is a divergence of opinion among the 
various state courts as to the constitutionality of the statutes 
of repose for architects and contractors. Clearly the majority of 
the opinions, (and, it is submitted the more rational and logical 
opinions) favor the constitutionality of such statutes consistent 
with the tests as enunciated in Berry. Cutshaw and Smith have 
demonstrated to this Court that there are alternative remedies 
available to Lichtefeld in this case as contemplated in Berry and 
consistent with the provisions of Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
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POINT III 
THE TITLE TO THE STATUTE (§78-12-25.5, UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED) ADEQUATELY 
EXPRESSES THE CONTENT OP THE STATUTE, AND 
THEREFORE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OP 
THE STATE OP UTAH. 
Lichtefeld contends that §78-12-25.5 is violative of Article 
VI, §22 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, which reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
... [N]o bills shall be passed containing more 
than one subject, which shall be clearly 
expressed in its title. 
Lichtefeld argues that the title "Injury Due to Defective Design 
or Construction of Improvement to Real Property - Within Seven 
Years," does not advise members of the legislature or the public 
that it is not a statute of limitations. Lichtefeld claims that 
because of this alleged defect in the statute, the statute does 
not past constitutional muster. 
Lichtefeld cites cases he claims supportive of his position. 
However, not one of the cases cited support Lichtefeld!s 
proposition. In fact, one case cited by Lichtefeld supports the 
proposition that the title of §78-12-25.5 is reasonably and 
permissibly related to the subject of the statute. This Court in 
State v. Twitchell. 333 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1959), wrote that, "The 
title does not have to be an index to the act. All that is 
required is that the subject matter of the act be reasonably 
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related to the title and that all parts of the act be reasonably 
related to each other." Twitchell, at 1078. 
The Utah Supreme Court in a case more current than those 
presented by Lichtefeld has inquired as to the fair notice content 
of the title of a statute. In its opinion in McGuire v. 
University of Utah Medical Center. 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979), this 
Court addressed legislative requirements with respect to drafting 
titles. This court stated as follows: 
The legislature would be required to draft 
titles with as much care as they must expend 
on the substance of the laws passed, and if 
they did not, legislative enactments would 
constantly be attacked in the courts. The 
legislature should not be burdened with an 
overly rigid interpretation of a basically 
salubrious constitutional principle, cind the 
law does not so require. Obviously, a fair 
synopsis serves the useful purpose of alerting 
legislators to the content of a bill, especial-
ly in a legislature with limited staff 
personnel, but fair notice of the content of 
a bill is all that is constitutionally 
required. 
McGuire, at 789. 
Lichtefeld then asserts that a no-action statute is not a 
statute of limitations which, Lichtefeld claims, renders the 
statute unconstitutional. Because the title to the Act refers to 
"limitation on actions," Lichtefeld concludes that the title fails 
to give reasonable notice of the statute's subject matter. 
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Interpreting a statute similar to §78-12-25.5, a New Mexico 
court has held that a no-action provision literally is a 
limitation on actions that may be brought. The reference in the 
title to "limitation on actions" logically and naturally connects 
with the no-action provision of the statute. The title provides 
reasonable notice therefor of the subject matter and does not 
violate the constitution. See, Howell v. Burke, 568 P.2d 214, 218 
(N.M.Ct.App. 1977). See also, Cheney v. Smith, 108 Idaho 209, 697 
P.2d 1223 (Id.App. 1985); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 
1984) . The Supreme Court of Washington has determined that the 
test of sufficiency of a title to an act is whether it provides 
sufficient notice to lead an interested person to inquire into the 
bill's contents. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984). The 
title of the Utah statute of repose meets those conditions as set 
forth above, and therefore passes constitutional scrutiny. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS 
AMENDED), IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A SPECIAL 
LAW OR LEGISLATION. 
Lichtefeld argues that §78-12-25.5 is violative of 
Article VI, §26 of the Utah Constitution which states: "No private 
or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be 
applicable." 
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Lichtefeld cites as controlling the Wyoming case of Phillips 
v, ABC Builders. Inc.. 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). In Phillips, the 
court held that a similar Wyoming statute was a special law, at 
least to the extent that no special law can be enacted where a 
general one may be made applicable. 
Regarding special legislation, the general rule is that 
although the legislature may classify and enact statutes, there 
must be a reasonable basis to support special legislation 
classification of a statute. If there is a distinguishing factor, 
the legislature may properly adopt the classification, even if 
some inequality may result. See, Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital 
Building v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341, 348 (Idaho 1982); Yarbro v. 
Hilton Hotels Corporation. 655 P.2d 822, 829 (Colo. 1982). In 
cases involving claims of special legislation, the burden is on 
the appellant to demonstrate that any classification is arbitrary 
and unreasonable. It follows then that a reasonable and 
unarbitrary classification based upon substantial differences 
which relate to the public purpose is not precluded by this consti-
tutional provision. See, Hale v. City and County of Denver, 441 
P.2d 332 (Colo. 1966); Yarbro, supra, at 828. 
As set out in preceding arguments, Cutshaw and Smith have 
demonstrated to this Court that the Legislature of the State of 
Utah could very well have, and did, determine §78-12-25.5 
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reasonable based upon the necessary protection to be afforded the 
particular class covered by the statute. 
The Supreme Courts of the States of Colorado, Arkansas and 
Montana, among others, have reviewed this issue of special 
legislation pertaining to statutes similar to §78-12-25.5 In 
Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976), the 
court considered the contention that a statute similar to 
§78-12-25.5, violated due process, was discriminatory, 
contravening equal protection of the law, and was local and 
special legislation and stated: 
... [Materialmen and the owners of buildings 
or structures who are in sole control of a 
premises after completion of the work are not 
similarly situated with [the protected class]. 
They are not in the same class with those 
described in the act. Particularly is this 
true after construction is substantially 
completed and accepted by the owners. Part of 
acceptance is to accept some future 
responsibility for the condition of the 
premises. (Emphasis supplied by the court) 
*** 
We have carefully considered Skinner v. 
Anderson concerning this appeal. In all 
deference and respect to the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, we cannot apply its 
reasoning to this case. That court held the 
Illinois statute, there challenged, to be 
discriminatory against others similarly 
situated. Further, a vital distinction, 
nonetheless, exists between owners or suppliers 
and those engaged in the professions and 
occupations of design and building. This is 
not arbitrary or unreasonable. It is a 
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legitimate, practical exercise of the 
legislative function. 
Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976), citing 
with approval Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 SW.2d 918, 920 (Ark. 
1970), cert, denied 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 868, 27 L.Ed.2d 800; 
See also, Yarbro, supra, at 827. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has determined that 
the standard which governs whether legislative classifications are 
rational is whether facts can be reasonably conceived which would 
justify distinctions or differences in state policy as between 
different persons. Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
The Utah Legislature, as noted in previous argument, in 1988, saw 
fit to expand the class protected by §78-12-25.5 to include 
surveyors. By expanding the statute, the Utah Legislature, it can 
be assumed, determined that surveyors legitimately fall within the 
group of persons who supply improvements to real property or 
design the same. This is a rational classification and further 
serves to bring home the point that those who are owners or 
occupiers of an improvement to real property, or suppliers of 
material, are indeed a separate and distinct class from those 
protected under the statute. 
Lichtefeld has made no showing to this Court by which this 
Court may rule that §78-12-25.5 is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT POUND THAT §78-12-25.5, UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED) IS PROPERLY A 
LIMITATION, PREVENTING AN OWNER OR PERSON IN 
ACTUAL POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY FROM 
COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST ARCHITECTS OR 
CONTRACTORS 
Lichtefeld attempts to heap confusion upon the Court in his 
assertion that §78-12-25.5 does not act as a limitation or apply 
to any person in actual possession or control or the owner of the 
property in question. In support his contention, Lichtefeld cites 
to the court the last two paragraphs of §78-12.25.5. For the sake 
of convenience, Cutshaw and Smith restate the excepting clause: 
. . . the limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual 
possession and control as the owner, tenant or 
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the 
defective and unsafe condition of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of 
the injury for which it is proposed to bring 
an action. 
Lichtefeld then claims that the excepting clause has not been 
interpreted by the Courts of Utah. Lichtefeldfs Brief, at 6. 
In Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), cited 
liberally throughout Lichtefeld1s brief, this Court analyzed the 
excepting provision contained in §78-12-25.5. The plaintiffs in 
Good argued, as does Lichtefeld in the present case, that the owner 
of the property at the time of construction is not affected by the 
seven-year limitation and may sue within the applicable limitation 
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period after injury is occasioned and that his right to sue runs 
with the land. The Utah Supreme Court quickly discarded this 
argument, stating as follows: 
The exception in the statute makes inapplicable 
the seven year limitation period against the 
original owner, and it allows others to sue him 
for his torts, if any, within the regular 
statutes of limitations after the cause 
accrues. TThe exception] prevents the owner 
as well as all others from suing the designer, 
planner, supervisor or contractor after seven 
years from completion of the project. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Good, at 224-225. 
The Court in Good went on to state that 
we think that this interpretation makes more 
sense than to allow the original owner the 
right to sue after seven years but to deny a 
stranger that right. This is especially true 
since the owner or tenant in possession and 
control is in a far better position to discover 
the defect, if any there be, than the stranger. 
Good, at 225. 
Cutshaw and Smith submit to this Court that they do not know 
of any other way to make the language interpreting §78-12.25.5 more 
clear. At the risk of being repetitive, the exception in the 
statute is directed to the owner or person in control of the 
property in question, and allows others who have been injured as 
a result of the defective improvement to the real property to 
maintain an action against the original owner or person in control 
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of the real property within the regular limitation periods which 
may go into effect after the cause of action accrues. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Cutshaw and Smith request 
this Court affirm the ruling of the lower Court, dismissing Cutshaw 
and Smith from the instant action, said dismissal with prejudice. 
DATED this / f day of October, 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
/U^^n^ 
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ADDENDUM I 
ADDENDUM 
STATUES CONSTITUTIONAL 
AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1988 
1. Arkansas (on equal protection basis). See, Carter v. 
Hartenstein. 455 S.W.2d 918 (Arkansas 1970). 
2. California (equal protection; due process basis). See, 
Regents of the University of California v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co. , 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197 (California 1978). 
Upheld in Salinero v. Pon, 177 Cal Rptr. 204, (Cal. App. 1981); 
Barnhouse v. City of Pinole. 183 Cal Rptr. 881 (Cal App. 1982). 
3. Colorado (upheld on equal protection, due process, open 
court provision basis). See, Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 
655 P.2d 822 (Colorado 1983). 
4. Delaware (upheld on equal protection; open court basis). 
See, Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co., 
489 A.2d 413 (Delaware 1985). 
5. District of Columbia (upheld on equal protection basis). 
See, Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 632 F.Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 
1986). 
6. Florida (upheld on open court basis). See, American 
Liberty Insurance Co. v. West & Conyers, 491 S.2d 573 (Fla. App. 
1986). 
1 
7. Georgia (upheld under open court provisions). See, Nelms 
v. Georgian Manor Condominium Association. 321 S.E.2d 330 (Georgia 
1984) . 
8. Idaho (upheld as it did not violate "remedy provision," 
federal and state equal protection laws or state constitution 
provision prohibiting special laws). See, Twins Falls Hospital and 
Clinic Building v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982). 
9. Illinois (statute revised; held constitutional on equal 
protection special legislation basis). See, Blackwood v. Rusk, 
102 111. Dec. 447, 148 111. App. 3d 168, 500 N.E.2d (1986), appeal 
allowed 106 111. Dec. 144, 113 111.2d 572, 505 N.E.2d 350. 
10. Indiana (upheld on basis of equal protection). See, 
Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Indiana App. 1983). 
11. Louisiana (upheld on basis of equal protection, due 
process, and right of access to courts). See, Burmaster v. Gravity 
Drainage District No. 2, 366 S.2d 1381 (Louisiana 1978). 
12. Maryland (upheld on the basis the statute did not violate 
equal protection, was not a special law, and did not violate remedy 
provision of state constitution). See, Whiting-Turner Contracting 
Co. v. Couoard. 499 A.2d 178 (Maryland 1985). 
13. Massachusetts (upheld on basis of equal protection, due 
process and remedied by recourse of laws). See, Klein v. Catalano, 
437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982). 
2 
14. Michigan (upheld on equal protection and due process 
basis). See, O'Brien v. Hazlet & Erdal. 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 
1980). 
15. Minnesota (upheld on basis of equal protection, due 
process; remedy of injuries laws of state constitution). See, 
Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minnesota 1982). 
16. Mississippi (upheld on basis of access to court and as 
special law). See, Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., 
Inc., 402 S.2d 320 (Mississippi 1981). 
17. New Jersey (upheld on basis of equal protection and due 
process). See, Rosenberg v. Town of North Burgen, 293 A. 2d 662 
(N.J. 1972). 
18. New Mexico (upheld on basis of equal protection and due 
process). See, Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214 (New Mexico App. 
1977) . 
19. North Carolina (upheld on basis of equal protection and 
open-court remedy). See, Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 
868 (North Carolina 1983). 
20. New York. See, Sears & Roebuck Co. v. Enco Assoc, 43 
NY.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 NY Supp.2 767 (1977). 
21. Ohio (held constitutional on the basis of equal 
protection and due process). See, Elizabeth Gamble 
3 
Decon Home Association v. Turner Construction Co,, 470 N.E.2d 950 
(Ohio App. 1984). 
22. Oregon (upheld on the basis of open courts provision of 
the Oregon constitution). See, Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 
(Ore. 1971). 
23. Pennsylvania (upheld on the basis of open courts 
provision of Pennsylvania constitution). See, Freezer Storage, 
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Penn. 1978). 
24. Rhode Island (upheld on the basis of open courts 
provisions of the Rhode Island constitution). See, Kennedy v. 
Cumberland Engineering Co. . Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (Rhode Island 1984) . 
25. Tennessee (held constitutional under the open courts 
provision of the Tennessee constitution). See, Harmon v. Angus R. 
Jessop Associates, Inc.. 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981). 
26. Texas (held constitutional under due process of Texas 
constitution). See, Ellerbee v. Otis Elevator Co,, 618 S.W.2d 870 
(Texas App. 1981). 
27. Virginia (held constitutional). See, Comptroller v. 
King. 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1977). 
28. Washington (held constitutional under equal protection 
provisions of Washington and U.S. constitutions). See, Yakima 
Fruit and Cold Storage v. Central Heating and Plumbing Co. , 503 
P.2d 108 (Wash. 1973). 
4 
29. Wisconsin (upheld on basis of due process). See, United 
States Fire Insurance Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 313 N.W.2d 883 
(Wisconsin 1982). 
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ADDENDUM I I 
ADDENDUM 
STATUES UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1988 
1. Alaska (held unconstitutional on the basis of equal 
protection). See, Turner Construction v. Scales, 752 P.2d 462 
(Alaska 1988). 
2. Alabama (held unconstitutional on basis that two subjects 
were contained in one title; statute vague; open-court provision 
of Alabama constitution). See, Fort Jackson v. Manesman Demag 
Corp., 435 S.2d 725 (Alabama 1983). 
3. Florida (declared unconstitutional based upon open-courts 
provision of the Florida constitution; due process). See, Overland 
Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 S.2d 572 (Florida 1979). 
4. Hawaii (declared unconstitutional on equal protection 
basis). See, Shibuya v. Architects of Hawaii, Ltd., 627 P.2d 277 
(Hawaii 1982). 
5. Kentucky (declared unconstitutional on basis of due 
process and special legislation). See, Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 
218 (Ky. 1973). 
6. Nevada (declared unconstitutional on equal protection 
basis) . See, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. All Electric, 
Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nevada 1983). 
1 
7. New Hampshire (declared unconstitutional on equal 
protection basis). See, Henderson Clay Products v. Edgar Wood and 
Associates, 451 A.2d 174 (NH 1982). 
8. Oklahoma (declared unconstitutional on equal protection 
basis). See, Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1985 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 
143 (Oklahoma 1977). 
9. South Carolina (declared unconstitutional on equal 
protection basis). See, Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 
1978). 
10. Wyoming (declared unconstitutional on open court, equal 
protection and special laws basis). See, Phillips v. ABC Builders, 
Inc.. 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1981). 
cut.ad2 
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ADDENDUM III 
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvement to real 
proper ty — Within seven years . 
(1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to 
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property, or any action 
for damages sustained on account of the injury, 
may not be brought against any person perform-
ing or furnishing the design, planning, survey-
ing, supervising the construction of, or construct-
ing the improvement to real property more than 
seven years after the completion of construction. 
(b) In an action regarding property boundary 
surveys, the seven-year time period commences 
when the property survey is either recorded in 
the county recorder's office or filed in the county 
surveyor's office under Section 17-23-17. 
(2) The time limitation imposed by this section 
does not apply to any person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe condi-
tion of the improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which an action is brought. 
(3) This section does not extend or limit the periods 
otherwise prescribed by state law for the bringing of 
any action. 
(4) As used in this section: 
(a) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
partnership, or other legal entity. 
(b) "Completion of construction" means the 
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or 
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or 
possession of the improvement on real property. 
1988 
ADDENDUM IV 
78-12-25.5 Injury Due to Defective Design or Construction 
of improvement to Real Property -Within Seven Years. 
No action to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for an injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, nor any action for damages 
sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction or construction of 
such improvement to real property more than seven years 
after the completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, 
partnership, or any other legal entity. 
(2) "Completion of construction" for the purposes 
of this act shall mean the date of issuance of a 
certificate of substantial completion by the owner, 
architect, engineer or the agents, or the date of the 
owner's use or possession of the improvement on real 
property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not 
apply to any person in actual possession and control as 
owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury 
for which it is proposed to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as extending 
or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws 
of this state for the bringing of any action. 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
ART. I, §2 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
See. 2., [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require. 
A R T . I, § 11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
See. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall he barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
ART. VI, § 23 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
See. 23. [Bill to contain only one subject.] 
Except general appropriation bills, and bills, for the codification and 
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than 
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 24 
Sec 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ART. VI, $ 26 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
Sec 26. [Enumeration of private laws forbidden.] 
The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws 
in the following cases: 
1. Granting divorce. 
2. Changing the names of persons or places, or constituting one person 
the heir-at-law of another. 
3. Locating or changing county scats. 
4. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace. 
5. Punishing crimes and misdemeanors. 
6. Regulating the practice of courts of justice. 
7. Providing for a change of venue in civil or criminal actions. 
8. Assessing and collecting taxes. 
9. Regulating the interest on money. 
10. Changing the law of descent or succession. 
11. Regulating county and township affairs. 
12. Incorporating cities, towns or villages; changing or amending the 
charter of any city, town or village; laying out, opening, vacating or 
altering town plats, highways, streets, wards, alleys or public grounds. 
13. Providing for sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors 
or others under disability. 
14. Authorizing persons to keep ferries across streams within the State. 
15. Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures. 
16. Granting to an individual, association or corporation any privilege, 
immunity or franchise. 
17. Providing for the management of common schools. 
18. Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances 
of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected or 
appointed. 
The Legislature may repeal any existing special law relating to the 
foregoing subdivisions. 
In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall' 
be enacted. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the 
power of the Legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and 
fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates 
of freight, nasaaflre. toll and chararea of railroads, loll roads, ditch, flume 
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